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CASE NOTES
plete care on the part of another, when that other could have prevented the
loss if the drawee had not accepted the instrument. 9
 The transaction, under
the facts in this case, should end with the acceptance of the check by the
drawee; to hold otherwise would leave the way open for the establishment
of contingent liabilities on the part of those who deal with checks prior
to the acceptance of the drawee, and without knowledge of the forgery.
Those situations where money has been paid out before the check is accepted
present a new question and it is possible that a balancing of the loss on a
theory of comparative negligence might be more equitable in such a case.
In the case at hand, however, the drawee should be estopped by its own
action in accepting the check, from asserting that it may reclaim the money
from the defendant even though the latter may not have taken every possible
precaution.
SHEILA M. MCCUE
Negotiable Instruments—Mere Failure to Return a Check Within
Twenty-four Hours as Constituting Acceptance.—Fidelity e..1 Deposit
Co. of Md. v. Idaho Bank FS Trust Co. 1 --Plaintiff, bonding company of for-
warding bank, brought an action in the United States District Court in Idaho
against the defendant drawee bank for losses arising out of a check kiting
operation claiming: (a) that defendant as agent of the forwarding bank was
negligent in the performance of its duties in collecting certain checks for-
warded by plaintiff's assignor and, (b) alternatively, that in failing to return
these checks as dishonored within 24 hours after their receipt, defendant be-
came liable as acceptor thereof under § 27-1006 of the Idaho Code [NIL
§ 137]. On defendant's motion to dismiss, HELD: (1) The counts alleging
negligence in collection stated a cause of action since a drawee bank to which
a collection item has been forwarded direct is a collecting agent of the for-
warding bank as well as a paying agent of the drawer; and (2) the counts
alleging failure of the drawee to return the checks as dishonored within 24
hours after receipt did not state a cause of action since mere retention of
checks does not constitute an acceptance of them.
In accord with the instant case, it is generally held that a drawee bank,
receiving a check for collection from a forwarding bank, acts in the dual
capacity of collecting agent for the forwarder and paying agent for the
drawer? As such, the drawee's duty, as collecting agent, is to present the
checks for acceptance and payment; its duty to the drawer is to pay the
fl Railway Express Agency v. Bank of Philadelphia, 168 Miss. 279, 150 So. 525
(1933).
1 173 F. Supp. 70 (D. Idaho 1959).
2 Joffrion-Woods v. Brock, 180 La. 771, 157 So. 589 (1934); Old Motor Works
v. First State Savings Bank of Morend, 258 Mich. 269, 241 N.W. 813 (1932); First
Nat'l Bank of Murfreesboro v. First Nat'l Bank of Nashville, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 S.W.
965 (1913).
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check in accordance with his order if sufficient funds are on deposit to cover
it.3
The more difficult problem was the question of the liability of the
drawee bank as acceptor. Before the NIL, mere retention of a bill of
exchange by a drawee did not constitute acceptance although such could
be implied from the drawee's conduct.4 Under NIL § 132 acceptance must
be in writing. An exception is provided in § 137 where it is stated that
destruction or refusal by the drawee to return the bill within 24 hours
is deemed acceptance by him.
The leading case of Wisner v. First National Banks construed § 137
as meaning that mere retention by the drawee of a bill of exchange for more
than 24 hours after receipt was an acceptance, stating that, "in the enact-
ment of this section of the statute, the legislature regarded the presentation
for acceptance as a demand for acceptance, which when the bill is retained
by the drawee, implies a demand for its return . .. therefore the neglect
or failure to return is a refusal to return the bill."° The Court observed
that a contrary result would in effect require the payee or his forwarding
agent "simultaneously with the presentation to make a demand that the
instrument be accepted or returned dishonored within a certain time.
Although the rule of the Wisner case has been criticized by textwriters, 7
the majority of courts have followed it as the proper construction of § 137. 8
The minority position reasons that the NIL constitutes a 'codification
of the common law under which mere retention did not constitute accept-
ance,9
 that the language of § 137 which makes "refusal" • to return an ac-
ceptance does not apply to "failure" to return, 10 and that § 150 providing
that: "where a bill is duly presented for acceptance and is not accepted
within the prescribed time, the person presenting it must treat the bill as
dishonored by non-acceptance . .." seems to require more than mere inaction
by the drawee. Otherwise a bill retained beyond the 24 hour period would
be required under both sections to be treated as accepted and dishonored
at the same time.11
3 First Nat'l Bank of Murfreesboro v. First Nat'l Bank of Nash9le, supra note 2 at
213, 154 S.W. at 967.
4
 Moulton v. Matteson, 11 Hun. 268, aff'd 79 N.Y. 627 (1880) ; Short v. Blount,
99 N.C. 49, 5 S.E. 190 (1888) ; First Nat'l Bank v. McMichael, 106 Pa. 460 (1884).
5 220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 955 (1908).
6 Id. at 29, 68 Atl. at 958.
7
 1 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions, § 7:2 (4th ed. 1940) ; 5 Michie, Banks and
Banking, 520-521 (Perm. ed. 1950), 6 Zollman, Banks and Banking, 173-175 (1933).
8 First Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Bank of Campti, 163 La. 919, 113 So. 147 (1927) ;
Miller v. Farmers State Bank of Arco, 165 Minn. 359, 206 N.W. 930 (1925) ; Blackwelder
v. Fergus Motor Co., 80 Mont. 374, 260 Pac. 734 (1927) ; Clark v. Northern Pac. R. Co.,
55 N.D. 454, 214 N.W. 33 (1927) ; Mount Vernon Nat'l Bank v. Canby State
Bank, 129 Or. 36, 276 Pac. 262 (1929).
9
 Crawford, The Negotiable Instruments Law § 136 (4th ed. 1916) ; Feezer,
Acceptance of Bills of Exchange by Conduct, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 133.
10
 Mitchell Livestock Auction Co. Inc. v. Bryant State Bank, 65 S.D. 488, 275
N.W. 262 (1937).
11 Feezer, op. cit. supra note 9.
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Moreover, some courts have distinguished between time drafts and
checks and have held that even if mere retention of the former should con-
stitute acceptance, it would require a "strained construction of § 137" 12 to
reach the same result with respect to checks presented for payment's In
§ 137 the phrase "delivered for acceptance" seems inapplicable to checks
and other demand bills which, unlike time drafts, are customarily presented
not for "acceptance" but for "payment." The Wisner case and those following
it have held, impliedly or expressly, that it is immaterial whether the
paper, be it a check, a demand draft, or a time draft, is presented for pay-
ment or acceptance. The Court in First State Bank v. Black Bros. Co. stated
that, "presentment for payment most certainly comprehends, and the act
of payment most certainly includes, a 'signification by the drawee of his
assent to the order of the drawer,' within the broader meaning of that
term. . . ."14 Considering that presentment for payment and presentment
for acceptance are "two different acts well known to the law of negotiable
instruments . . . , "15 the Court in the instant case held that the section relied
on had no application to the factual situation presented.
The further question is raised as to whether the drawee bank when it
receives the check in the mail does so as agent of the forwarder or as agent
of the drawer. If as agent of the forwarder, what constitutes "presentment
to the drawee"?
Avoiding entanglement in these problems which were deemed to have
little relation to, or actual significance for, the practicalities of the banking
business, the Court took a realistic approach and adopted the view expressed
in First Nat'l Bank of Murfeesboro v. First Nat'l Bank of Nashville that:
"Where the drawee is acting in the dual capacity . . . there can be no accept-
ance . . . until the bills are passed through the books of the bank, charging
the account of the drawer and crediting the account of the remitting bank,
and making a completed transaction." 18
The Court also relied on § 26-1507 of the Idaho Code [§ 7 of the Bank
Collection Code] which provides that-where a drawee bank receives an
item it shall be deemed paid when finally charged to the account of the
drawer. Construing the word "paid" as including the act of acceptance, 17
it was held that this section precludes acceptance by mere retention.
Two months after the decision the Idaho legislature amended's § 27-
1006 of the Idaho Code [NIL § 137] by adding: ". . . provided that mere
12 173 F. Supp. 70, 71 (D. Idaho 1959).
12
 First Nat'l Bank v. Whitmore, 177 Fed. 397 (8th Cir. 1910); Urwiller v.
Platte Valley State Bank, 164 Neb. 630, 83 N.W.2d 88 (1957); First Nat'l Bank v.
Talky, 115 Tex. 591, 285 S.W. 612 (1926).
14 187 Okla. 124, 126, 101 P.2d 802, 803 (1940).
15 First National Bank v. Talley, 115 Tex. 591, 595; 285 S.W. 612, 613 (1926).
16 127 Tenn. 205, 216; 154 S.W. 965, 968 (1913).
17 It may be observed that although the Court might feel that presentment for
payment is a different juristic act than presentment for acceptance it may consistently
consider that "payment" includes a signification by the drawee of its assent to the
order of the drawer.
18 Session Laws 1959, c. 98.
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retention of such bill by the drawee unless its return has been demanded, will
not amount to an acceptance; and provided further that the provisions of
this section shall not apply to checks."
The provisions of § 137 of NIL were eliminated in the UCC. Under
this code, with no exceptions, acceptance must be in writing,14 although
a drawee will be liable to a holder in conversion if the drawee refuses on
demand to return the bill. 20
 Mere retention of an instrument, voluntarily
delivered, without a demand for return, constitutes neither an acceptance
nor a conversion.
KENNETH F. JOYCE
Negotiable Instruments—Stop Payment—Notice to the Payee.—Na-
tional Boulevard Bank of Chicago v. Schwartz)—Plaintiff bank received
a stop payment order from the drawer on a check issued to the defendant.
Drawer sent a similar notice to the defendant payee. Prior to its receipt
the defendant indorsed the check "for deposit only" and deposited it in
his checking account in his own bank. Plaintiff bank negligently cleared
the check for payment and so notified the payee's bank, which on the same
day permitted a withdrawal of substantially all the money represented by
the check. Later the same day after the withdrawal the plaintiff notified
the payee's bank of the mistake. The plaintiff having made the proper
adjustment in the drawer's account brings this action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover the amount
from the payee.2
In granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court
held that where the payee of a check has knowledge that the drawer has
stopped payment, but nevertheless accepts payment made as a result of
the drawee's negligence in clearing the check, the payee is liable to the
drawee on the grounds that under a restrictive indorsement the payee's
bank is only an agent for the purpose of collection. In such a relationship
the knowledge of the payee would preclude him from keeping the money.
A drawer may stop payment of a check prior to certification or pay-
ments Since the check does not operate as an assignment of the drawer's
funds in the bank, the drawee is not liable to the holder prior to acceptance
or certification.4 A drawee who has paid a check after a stop payment
UCC § 3-410.
2u UCC § 3-419.
1 175 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
2 Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
3 UCC § 4-403(1); Beutel, Brannon's Negotiable Instruments Law, § 189 (6th ed.
1938); Britton, Bills and Notes, § 181 (1943); 3 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions 3447
(1944).
4 NIL § 189; UCC § 3-409(0 ; N.Y. Negotiable Instruments Law, § 325; Brady,
Bank Checks, § 10 (2nd ed. 1926) ; 3 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions, 3487 (1944);
Moore, Sussman and Brand, Legal Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of
Checks, 42 Yale L.J. 817 (1933); 7 Am. Jur., Banks, § 602 (1937).
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